In offshore operations, cargo handling is among the activities with the greatest potential for risk. Data from the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers indicate that incidents related to lifting operations remain among the main causes of serious accidents in the oil and gas industry, often associated with human failures, inadequate communication and incorrect reading of operating conditions.
Analysis of international organizations indicates that a relevant portion of these events occur even in technically structured environments, which shifts the focus of the discussion to the quality of team preparation.
In Brazil, although there is no specific consolidated statistic for cargo accidents in port environments, the different available cut-outs point to the same risk vector. Data from the Public Ministry of Labor, in partnership with the International Labor Organization, indicate that the transport, storage and mail sector registered more than 40 thousand work accidents in 2023, with a strong incidence in activities related to cargo movement.
Recent reports by the National Agency for Waterway Transport, published between 2022 and 2023, also point out failures in lifting, mooring and handling operations as recurrent occurrences in safety audits in organized ports. Studies by the Jorge Duprat Figueiredo Foundation for Safety and Occupational Medicine, such as the 2021 technical survey on accidents in logistics operations, reinforce that events involving cargo drop, crushing and failures in lifting equipment are among the most frequent mechanisms of serious accidents.
Because of this, operators and service providers have made a deeper review of their training models. The training is no longer a one-off event, focused on certification or compliance with standards, and has been treated as a continuous process, directly connected to the reality of the operation.
In offshore environments, where variables such as wind, unit movement, visibility and interaction between teams change rapidly, the ability to interpret context and make decisions under pressure has become as relevant as the technical mastery of equipment.
Impact of behaviour and communication
Cognitive errors, such as overconfidence, confirmation bias and situational communication failures are present in a relevant portion of hoisting accidents. Because of this, training began to incorporate elements of behavior and perception, in addition to bringing different functions of the organization to the context.
A misinterpreted command, a delay in response or a misreading of signaling can trigger a chain of events with relevant impact. Therefore, specialist companies have incorporated the simulation of interactions that occur in the day-to-day operations, reflecting the complexity of the offshore environment.
Another important axis is the use of operational data to feed back training. More structured companies have integrated records of near accidents, operational deviations and critical events to training programs. Instead of working with generic examples, the exercises begin to reflect real situations experienced by the operation itself. This approach approximates training practice and reduces the distance between what is taught and what actually happens in the field.
In addition, the systematic analysis of these data allows identifying patterns that would hardly be perceived in isolation. Frequency of failures in certain types of operation, recurrence of errors in specific interfaces between teams or inconsistencies in procedures become inputs for continuous review of training content. Learning is no longer reactive and becomes structured.
This movement has a direct impact on the chain of command within the operation. When the team is trained based on real events, the perception of risk is calibrated more precisely. Operators who have already simulated the consequences of a communication failure during a hoisting in rough seas react differently in the same situation in the real environment. The memory built in the training starts to act as a decision reference, reducing the response time at times when stopping the operation is the safest choice.
Simulation and practical training: where the method meets the real environment
The offshore hoisting training is not limited to the behavioral dimension. It needs to include, with equal depth, the technical knowledge about the equipment that makes up the lifting system, the rules governing its specification and the criteria that determine when a component should be removed from operation.
Steel cables, slings, shackles, straps and hoisting accessories work within precise technical parameters. The safe workload of each component is defined from the specific application, and ignoring this sizing, either by ignorance or by operating pressure, is a direct path to failures that visual inspection cannot predict. Standards such as ABNT NBR ISO 4309, which establishes criteria for the disposal of steel cables in lifting equipment, and the NBR 13541 and NBR 15637 families and their references, applicable to slings and lifting belts, provide the technical reference that needs to be in this repertoire of any professional activity.
Periodic inspection of lifting elements is, in this context, an extension of training. Professionals trained to identify signs of abrasive wear, flexural fatigue, localized corrosion and structural deformations are able to act before the problem becomes an event. Incidents with loads on offshore platforms generate downtime, equipment damage, maintenance costs and, in severe cases, removals and irreversible consequences for teams.
By Fernando Fuertes, Eng.o and New Business Developer at Acro Cabos.
Finally, the path that the most mature organizations in the sector have been following is to integrate behavior, operational data, practical simulation and technical knowledge of the equipment in a cohesive and continuous program. When this set works in an articulated way, training is no longer a requirement to be fulfilled and becomes the basis on which the operation is sustained, even when the sea does not collaborate.